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THE ABRAHAM L. POMERANTZ
LECTURE

Clearinghouse Governance
MOVING BEYOND COSMETIC REFORM
†

Kristin N. Johnson
INTRODUCTION

The procedures that boards adopt in their decisionmaking processes raise uniquely interesting questions. In one
of the most thoughtful modern critiques of the functional role of
corporate boards, theorists Colin Carter and Jay Lorsche argue
that three critical issues influence the effectiveness of boards’
1
decision-making processes—time, knowledge, and information.
While each of the three elements merits careful consideration,
conventional wisdom suggests that it is difficult, if not
impossible, for boards to make rational business decisions if
they do not allocate sufficient time to decision-making
2
processes. Recent popular accounts contradict the prevailing
†

Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. B.S.F.S., Georgetown
University; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. The author would like to thank
Frank Partnoy, James Fanto, Kent Greenfield, the Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture
Committee and Brooklyn Law School for the invitation to present these early
reflections on pending federal rules. For excellent research assistance, I thank Mark
Lauria, Christopher Gelpi, and Rick Halmo.
1
COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD 50-51,
67-68 (2003).
2
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-75 (Del. 1985). But see
Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS.
LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) (strongly criticizing the majority opinion as “one of the worst
decisions in the history of corporate law”). The Delaware legislature adopted a
statutory provision permitting companies incorporated in Delaware to amend their
corporate charters to exculpate directors from claims alleging that they breached their
fiduciary duties by failing to adopt a sufficiently rigorous investigative process or a
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presumption that dedicating more time to the decision-making
3
process improves the quality of the ultimate decision. In his
New York Times best-selling account of the power of thinking,
Malcolm Gladwell explains the countervailing view, arguing
that decisions made in the blink of an eye may be as valuable
4
as decisions characterized by months of rational analysis.
Notwithstanding the accolades bestowed on Gladwell’s
contribution to the literature, not everyone finds his account
persuasive. Dissecting Gladwell’s arguments that extol the virtues
of “snap” decision making, Frank Partnoy’s recent article—“Don’t
Blink: Snap Decisions and Securities Regulation”—offers an
insightful analysis of the significance of timing and careful
5
Evaluating the
reflection in decision-making processes.
convergence of increasingly complicated securities-trading
technologies and complex financial products, Partnoy contends that
boards may benefit from introducing a measured pace in their
6
decision-making processes. Examining precipitating decisions at
financial institutions in the period preceding the recent financial
crisis and the events of the flash crash that threatened financial
markets in May 2010, Partnoy concludes that boards should
introduce procedural reforms that deter “snap” decision making
and introduce safeguards that institute a delay or “pause” in
financial institutions’ decision-making processes and financial
7
intermediaries’ operational processes.
In addition to agreeing with Partnoy’s suggestion that
decision makers may benefit from deliberation and delay in
their decision-making processes, this article argues that
further procedural safeguards are necessary to protect the
stability of financial institutions and financial intermediaries.
Evaluation of the board’s timeframe for making decisions forms
part of a broader set of concerns regarding director
accountability and institutional safeguards for risk-management
oversight in the wake of the recent global financial crisis. In

reasonable due diligence process. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Within
two years of the Van Gorkom decision, forty-two states had adopted similar exculpation
clauses. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (1990).
3
See, e.g., MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT
THINKING 8 (2005).
4
See id.
5
See generally Frank Partnoy, Don’t Blink: Snap Decisions and Securities
Regulation, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 151 (2011).
6
See generally id.
7
See generally id.
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order to ensure that boards fulfill risk oversight obligations,
proposed regulatory reforms should effectively address the other
issues that influence the board’s ability to monitor, such as
impartiality, expertise, and access to information.
To illustrate the importance of these governance
safeguards, this article explores federal regulatory reform
proposals in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market.
For more than two decades, commentators have encouraged
regulators to adopt reforms that introduce a better regulatory
8
framework in the OTC derivatives market. During the recent
crisis, a number of financial institutions experienced
9
devastating losses related to their OTC derivatives portfolios.
In response, the federal government extended several hundred
10
billion dollars in federal aid to these financial institutions.
The federal bailout prompted demands for federal regulatory
intervention. Congress, in turn, adopted the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
11
The newly minted legislation imposes greater
Act).
transparency in the OTC derivatives market by requiring that
market participants settle and clear eligible OTC derivatives
12
transactions through registered derivatives clearinghouses.
Notwithstanding the many benefits that clearinghouses
engender, it is too early to celebrate the reforms’ success. In
order for clearinghouses to have the desired risk-reducing
effects, reforms must reach the more complicated issues that
challenge risk governance. Regulation must introduce
procedural measures that reduce the conflicts of interest or
cognitive biases that lead boards to adopt weak riskmanagement policies. Well-tailored governance safeguards are
8

See, e.g., Remarks of Brooksley Born, Chairperson Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, Fordham University School of Law 1999 Derivatives & Risk
Management Symposium (Jan. 28, 1999), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/
opaborn-42.htm; Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1023-32 (2007) (discussing the advocates who
supported deregulation of off-exchange traded derivatives); andré douglas pond
cummings, Still “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
Other 1990s Deregulation Facilitated the Market Crash of 2002, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 467, 530 (2007) (same).
9
Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G., Still Troubled, Cuts Loss Sharply in First
Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at B1.
10
David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow
Tighter Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A1.
11
See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
12
Id. But see Gretchen Morgenson, 3,000 Pages of Financial Reform, but Still
Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at B1.
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necessary to ensure accountability for risk-management
oversight and to prevent clearing requirements from
inadvertently creating a new source of systemic risk.
This article examines proposed regulatory reforms in
the OTC derivatives market, focusing on the Dodd-Frank Act’s
requirement for derivatives counterparties to register and clear
eligible transactions through clearinghouses. While the
introduction of clearing requirements engenders important
risk-mitigating benefits, commentators have voiced concerns
regarding the incentives that certain larger, prominent
clearinghouse members may have to adopt weak riskgovernance policies, or policies that limit access to
clearinghouse membership. These concerns cast a shadow over
the promise of reform. Regulators are moving quickly to
address these concerns, but their proposed treatment is as
disconcerting as the incomplete legislative approach.
Regulators’ proposed reforms—customary board composition
and structural solutions to the agency costs and conflicts of
interest that arise in corporate governance—may be misguided
in the context of clearinghouses.
As Partnoy suggests, effective reforms must extend
beyond conventional techniques and creatively address the
timing element of decision making. We must consider
mechanisms such as a required “pause” in the risk governance
decision-making process. Because the debate regarding the final
contours of regulatory guidelines continues, this article limits its
purpose to outlining the origins of OTC derivatives, their role in
the crisis, and the proposed legislative and regulatory efforts to
address relevant concerns. Finally, this article underscores
significant issues that regulators must consider as they engage
in one of the most rigorous rule-making periods in the history of
the federal regulation of financial markets.
I.

CRISIS AND REFORM IN THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET

While many weaknesses in the regulation of financial
markets contributed to the recent financial crisis, the absence of
regulation in the OTC derivatives market has led to particularly
significant concerns. Focusing on the role of credit default swaps
(CDS) in the recent crisis, Section A argues that the lack of
regulation in the OTC derivatives market created moral-hazard
and systemic-risk concerns. Section B surveys the reforms
Congress has adopted to address these concerns.
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OTC Derivatives and the Financial Crisis

Tasked with exploring “how the world’s strongest
13
financial system came to the brink of collapse[,]” the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission narrowed this broad inquiry to one
central question:
[H]ow did it come to pass that in 2008 our nation was forced to
choose between two stark and painful alternatives—either risk the
total collapse of our financial system and economy or inject trillions
of taxpayer dollars into the financial system and an array of
companies, as millions of Americans still lost their jobs, their
savings, and their homes?14

The Commission’s inquiry highlights the moral-hazard
and systemic-risk concerns that plagued financial markets for
the last several years. The origin or genesis of the crisis,
however, dates back at least two decades. In the twenty-year
period prior to the recent financial crisis, financial institutions
acquired unprecedented debt portfolios; during this period, the
volume of debt products that financial institutions held
15
increased from $3 trillion to $36 trillion. Evidence suggests
that, in pursuit of profits, financial institutions implemented
highly leveraged business and investment strategies, meaning
their exposure to debt obligations far exceeded the capital or
16
collateral reserves available to satisfy those debt obligations.
During the same period, consolidation in the financial
services industry led to a high concentration of credit-related
17
risks. The small group of financial institutions participating
in the origination and trading of higher-risk credit and debt
investment products began to increase their roles as market
18
makers and counterparties in the OTC derivatives market.
13

FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xvi (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
14
Id.
15
Id. at xvii.
16
See Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate
Governance 14, 22, 32 (San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11052, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794190##.
17
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT
ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: FIRST QUARTER 2010, at 1 (2010)
(“Derivatives activity in the U.S. banking system continues to be dominated by a small
group of large financial institutions.”).
18
As of March 2008, the top twenty-five commercial and investment banks in the
United States held more than $13 trillion in credit default swaps, with J.P. Morgan Chase,
Citibank, Bank of America, and Wachovia among the most active traders in credit default
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Contemporaneously, the size of the OTC derivatives market
increased markedly—growing from a notional amount of $95.2
19
trillion in 2000 to approximately $673 trillion in 2007.
The absence of regulation fostered obscurity in the OTC
derivatives market. In the late 1990s and early 2000s,
legislators expressly rejected calls for regulatory oversight in
the OTC derivatives market and adopted legislation exempting
OTC derivatives from the regulatory purview of the Securities
Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading
20
Commission. Critics argued that regulation would have been
redundant because self-regulation and a spirit of “selfpreservation . . . would shield [financial institutions] from fatal
21
risk-taking.” Moreover, critics of regulation concluded that
22
regulation would “stifle innovation.”
CDSs reallocate risk by spreading risk exposure across
a group of creditors, thereby reducing the risk exposure that
23
CDS agreements allow
each individual creditor faces.
protection buyers to shift some percentage of the risk of an
issuer’s default on a debt obligation identified in the CDS
agreement (covered debt obligation) to its counterparty in the

swaps. Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME BUSINESS (Mar. 17,
2008), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html.
19
FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 48.
20
See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default
Swaps Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 175, 221-28 (2011) (explaining congressional
legislative efforts to ensure that federal regulatory agencies lacked authority to
exercise jurisdiction over OTC derivatives); FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 48-50
(discussing the effect of the adoption of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000); see also id. at xviii (examining the absence of regulation and weak selfregulatory measures, the FCIC explained that “[m]ore than 30 years of deregulation
and reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions, championed by former Federal
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and others, supported by successive
administrations and Congresses, and actively pushed by the powerful financial
industry at every turn, had stripped away key safeguards”).
21
FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at xviii; see also Edmund L. Andrews,
Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B1;
Jacob M. Schlesinger, What’s Wrong? The Deregulators: Did Washington Help Set Stage
for Current Business Turmoil?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at A1 (explaining how CFTC
Chair Brooksley Born was strongly criticized for attempting to investigate the need for
regulation in the OTC derivatives market).
22
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at xviii; see also Schlesinger, supra note
21, at B1 (“[Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin] took seriously Wall Street’s complaints
that even the threat of regulation could void pending transactions. Mr. Greenspan
believed that innovative derivatives were making the economy more efficient by
providing companies with a hedge against financial fluctuations.”).
23
See Partnoy & Skeel, Jr., supra note 8, at 1023-27 (discussing the benefits
of CDSs).
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24

agreement—the protection seller. Early proponents of CDSs
25
praised the instruments for their risk-mitigating benefits.
Arguably, this reallocation of risk militates against systemic
risk—the threat that one large debt issuer’s default or several
debtors’ defaults may cripple a systemically significant
financial institution or trigger a domino effect of losses, leading
26
to broader market disruption or multiple insolvencies.
While many financial institutions faltered during the
crisis, American International Group, Inc.’s (AIG) notorious
and unparalleled liquidity and solvency crisis prompted the
government to intervene and extend unprecedented federal
27
financial aid to the international insurance firm. AIG’s
exposure to CDSs illustrates the concerns arising from
financial institutions’ increasing involvement in the OTC
28
derivatives market. In the early 2000s, AIG’s Financial
24

See, e.g., id. at 1023-24; Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks
Before the Futures Indus. Ass’n, Boca Raton, Fla. (Mar. 19, 1999) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990319.htm) (stating that “[b]y
far the most significant event in finance during the past decade has been the
extraordinary development and expansion of financial derivatives”).
25
Alan Greenspan was one of the most outspoken senior regulators to endorse
the risk-spreading benefits of credit derivatives. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed.
Reserve, Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago’s Forty-First Annual Conference on Bank Structure: Risk Transfer and Financial
Stability (May 5, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/
Speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm) (“Two years ago at this conference I argued that
the growing array of derivatives and the related application of more-sophisticated [sic]
methods for measuring and managing risks had been key factors underlying the
remarkable resilience of the banking system, which had recently shrugged off severe
shocks to the economy and the financial system.”).
26
See Partnoy & Skeel, Jr., supra note 8, at 1023-32 (discussing the
advocates who supported deregulation of off-exchange traded derivatives).
27
For a description of the details of the AIG bailout, see Press Release, Fed.
Reserve Bd. (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/other/20080916a.htm (announcing bailout and explaining that failure of AIG
would damage markets).
28
Specifically, AIG’s difficulties stemmed from its participation in the credit
derivatives market. Credit derivatives are one class of OTC derivatives. The class of
credit derivatives comprises two types of financial products, credit default swaps and
collateralized debt obligations. Credit default swap agreements are bilateral contracts
that allow parties to transfer risk, allowing a creditor to shift to a CDS counterparty
some or all of the risk exposure related to a debt obligation (covered debt obligation)
referenced in the contractual agreement. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 192-96. The
covered debt issuer’s default triggers the CDS counterparty’s obligations (protection
seller) to provide insurance-like protection on the covered debt obligation. The notional
amount of an OTC derivatives transaction describes the par amount or face value of
the bonds or debt instruments that comprise the covered debt obligations named in the
agreement. Id. at 215 n.246 (citation omitted). The party who buys protection in a
credit default swap agreement (protection buyer) faces two types of credit or default
risks. The protection buyer faces the risk that the issuer of the covered debt obligation
will default. Id. at 194. If the debt issuer defaults, the protection buyer looks to the
protection seller to satisfy its obligations under the terms and mitigate losses related to
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Products division (AIGFP) aggressively developed its position
29
in the credit derivatives market. Historical analysis of default
rates on certain debt securities, such as residential mortgages,
suggested a low probability of any significant losses on
collateralized debt obligations composed of these debt
30
instruments. As a result, protection sellers presumed that
CDS agreements offering protection against a decline in the
value of collateralized debt obligations (CDO)—specifically
CDOs that bundled residential mortgages—presented little
31
risk exposure.
In the company’s 2002 annual report, AIG did disclose
AIGFP’s increasing participation in the credit derivatives
32
business. From 2003 to 2006, AIG’s annual reports discussed
OTC derivatives and included innocuous statements regarding
33
participation in the credit derivatives market. However, after
the covered debt obligation. Id. Consequently, the protection buyer faces another level
of credit risk, the threat that the protection seller will default on the terms of the CDS
agreement. Id. at 206. This latter risk is referred to as counterparty risk. Id.
29
Gretchen Morgenson, A.I.G., Where Taxpayers’ Dollars Go to Die, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at BU1.
30
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Financial Markets and Networks—Implications
for Financial Market Regulation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 613, 618-20 (2009).
31
See Johnson, supra note 20, at 215 n.248.
32
See, e.g., Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 97-99 (Mar. 31,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012303003570/
y65998e10vk.txt (discussing AIG’s financial services) (“AIGFP enters into credit derivative
transactions in the ordinary course of its business. The overwhelming majority of AIGFP’s
credit derivatives require AIGFP to provide credit protection on a designated portfolio of
loans or debt securities.”). Credit derivatives include CDS and collateralized debt
obligations. For a description of collateralized debt obligations or securitization, see Arthur
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 984-86 (2009) (“The
securitization process begins when a bank (referred to as the ‘sponsor’) transfers loans that
it has originated, or purchased from others, to a special-purpose entity (SPE). The SPE is
structured so that it will be shielded from potential claims arising out of the sponsor’s
bankruptcy. The SPE creates a loan pool (sometimes by combining the sponsor’s loans with
loans sold by other lenders), and the SPE sells that pool to a second SPE, typically organized
as a trust. The role of the second SPE is to manage the loan pool and to issue ABS that
confer rights to receive cash flows from the pooled loans. The second SPE (the ‘SPE issuer’)
hires an investment bank (frequently an affiliate of the sponsor) to underwrite the sale of
ABS to investors. After the underwriting has been completed, the proceeds paid by investors
for the ABS are transferred to the sponsor in payment for the loans. Also, in many cases, the
SPE issuer hires the sponsor to act as servicing agent for the securitized loans.”).
33
Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 106 (Mar. 15, 2004), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012304003302/y92059e10vk.htm; Am.
Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 180 (May 31, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012305006884/y03319e10vk.htm; Am. Int’l
Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 52 (Mar. 16, 2006), available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/76/76115/10K_06.pdf; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 63 (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/5272/000095012307003026/y27490e10vk.htm.
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the company began to suffer losses on its credit derivatives
34
portfolio in 2007, the tenor of the disclosure shifted
dramatically. The 2007 annual report disclosures revealed
AIG’s exposure to a net notional amount of protection covering
35
over $500 billion of debt products :
Net Notional Amount (in billions)
Corporate loans

$230

Prime residential mortgages

$149

Corporate debt/Collateralized loan
obligations

$70

Multi-sector collateralized debt
obligations

$78

Total

$527

Market participants had become overconfident, treating
the risk-mitigating benefits of CDSs as guarantees that
insured against losses related to an issuer’s default on a
36
covered debt obligation. As a result, market participants
underestimated the risk of counterparty default; they failed to
appreciate the danger that an issuer might default on its
obligations related to a covered debt and, at the same time,
that a protection seller might default on its obligations under
37
the CDS agreement. When default rates on subprime
mortgages began to accelerate in 2007, the absence of minimal,
conventional risk-monitoring and uniform collateral reserve
requirements in the OTC derivatives market triggered a
38
cascade of severe losses.
Because market participants mistakenly perceived
CDSs as guarantees that eliminated default risk, they reduced
34

Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 81 (Feb. 28, 2008)
[hereinafter AIG 2007 Annual Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/5272/000095012308002280/y44393e10vk.htm.
35
Id. at 122.
36
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 20, at 215-16.
37
Id.; Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to
Pass Real-World Test, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at A1; Serena Ng, AIG, Goldman
Unwind Soured Trades—Move on Mortgage Deals Leaves Insurer with Loss of About $2
Billion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2010, at C1.
38
FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at xxiv.
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demands for traditional risk-reducing safeguards, such as
39
reserving sufficient collateral to offset losses. Even when CDS
agreements did include collateral requirements, their terms
40
By the time CDS
were often significantly relaxed.
counterparties began to question protection sellers’ ability to
satisfy CDS obligations in 2007, the market was already
41
quickly unraveling.
What motivated AIG executives to aggressively increase
the company’s credit derivative portfolio in the years prior to the
financial crisis? Some theorists posit that executives at AIG and
other financial institutions received lucrative compensation based
on the fees that AIG earned on CDSs during the years prior to the
42
wave of subprime mortgage defaults that began in 2007.
As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission noted,
“Compensation systems—designed in an environment of cheap
money, intense competition, and light regulation—too often
rewarded the quick deal, the short-term gain—without proper
43
consideration of long-term consequences.” According to the
conclusions in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s report,
dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at
many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of
this crisis . . . . Too many of these institutions acted recklessly, taking
on too much risk, with too little capital, and with too much dependence
on short-term funding . . . . [L]arge investment banks and bank

39

See Heather Landy, Unregulated Market Faces Test as Corporate Defaults
Pile Up, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2008, at A9.
40
Mollenkamp, supra note 37, at A1; Ng, supra note 37, at C1.
41
Houman B. Shadab, Credit Risk Transfer Governance: The Good, the Bad,
and the Savvy, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 69-71),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919922.
42
Citigroup’s experience underwriting CDOs similarly suggests that
compensation arrangements rewarded executives for risk taking without imposing
parallel consequences if risky decisions led to significant losses. See Kristin N. Johnson,
Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight
Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 62-64 (2011). The structure of compensation
policies created incentives for executives and directors to take risk. Id. at 57. Citigroup
tripled its CDO offerings, increasing the total of CDO securities issued from $6.28 billion
in 2003 to $20 billion in 2005. See, e.g., Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, The Reckoning:
Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html. Citigroup
received approximately $500 million in fees from its CDO offerings in 2005. Id. When
residential mortgage default rates and foreclosures began to rise in 2007 and 2008, the
decline in the value of Citigroup’s CDO portfolio and inventory of traditional and subprime
mortgage-related assets forced Citigroup to substantially write down its CDO inventory. See
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial Crisis:
Reflections on In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 113, 18 (2010).
43
FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at xix.
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holding companies . . . focused their activities increasingly on risky
trading activities that produced hefty profits. They took on enormous
exposures in acquiring and supporting subprime lenders and creating,
packaging, repackaging, and selling trillions of dollars in mortgage44
related securities, including synthetic financial products.

In response to the announcement that “the first quarter
of 2008 ‘brought [AIG]’s CDS portfolio to a cumulative $20.6
billion loss between October 2007 and May 2008,’” shareholders
filed a derivative action alleging that directors breached their
fiduciary duties by failing to effectively monitor the company’s
45
exposure to risk in the credit derivatives market. Some have
argued that the novel claims seeking to hold directors liable for
failing to monitor risk offer a tool for balancing directors’
accountability for risk oversight with their authority to make
46
risk-management decisions for the company. However, recent
state court decisions indicate that plaintiffs face a high bar
when pleading that directors breached their fiduciary
obligations by failing to monitor risk exposure related to
47
sophisticated financial products.
As a result of limitations that exist under state fiduciary
accountability standards, recently adopted federal regulations
48
introduce additional reforms. The Dodd-Frank Act introduces
regulatory reforms intended to respond to concerns related to
financial institutions’ incentive-based compensation structures,
conflicts of interest related to compensation, and concerns
regarding the operational weaknesses in the OTC derivatives
49
50
market. In a separate project I address the former concerns.
This article outlines reform efforts addressing the latter concerns.
The recently adopted federal statute introduces an
institutional mechanism—a requirement that market
participants clear and settle eligible OTC derivatives contracts
through federally authorized clearinghouses. The clearing
requirement delegates primary risk-governing authority to an
intermediary—OTC
derivatives
clearinghouses.
While
44

Id. at xviii-xix.
See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Derivative Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 419, 426,
433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted).
46
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk
Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 967-68 (2009).
47
See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Derivative Litig., 415 F. App’x 285 (2d Cir. 2011).
48
See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
49
See Johnson, supra note 20, at 240-42.
50
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 42, at 56-57.
45
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imposing clearing requirements on eligible OTC derivatives
transactions creates a more transparent and more efficient
market, delegating primary regulatory oversight to
clearinghouses also raises certain risk-governance concerns.
B.

The Road to Reform: Clearinghouses

Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act requires OTC
derivatives market participants to register OTC transactions
with an information repository and to clear these transactions
through registered derivatives clearing organizations (DCO) or
51
clearinghouses. Prior to the imposition of registration and
clearing requirements, parties trading in the OTC derivatives
52
market entered into private, bilateral contracts. The DoddFrank Act assigns regulatory oversight of securities-related
OTC derivatives and commodities-related OTC derivatives to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Commodity
Futures
Trading
Commission
(CFTC),
53
respectively. Clearinghouses and exchanges are commonly
54
used to register and clear other financial products. Each
registered clearinghouse will offer a platform for originating
and trading OTC derivatives that comply with the federal
55
agencies’ final rules.

51

Dodd-Frank Act §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. at 1675-82, 1762-84.
See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, Jr., supra note 8, at 1021-22.
53
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. at 1675-82, 1762-84.
54
For historical reflections on the use of financial intermediaries for clearing and
settlement services, see generally Alexander D. Noyes, Stock Exchange Clearing Houses, 8
POL. SCI. Q. 252, 256 (1893); see also Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets
Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Overthe-Counter Innovations, 31 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 596, 598-604 (1999).
55
Clearinghouses began clearing OTC derivatives well before the financial
crisis. During the crisis when it became apparent that regulation was imminent,
financial intermediaries petitioned regulatory agencies for formal authorization and
acknowledgement of their authority to clear and settle OTC derivatives transactions.
The CFTC has cleared eight companies as clearinghouses with one company’s
registration pending. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC
Grants CME Clearing Europe Limited Registration as a Derivatives Clearing
Organization (Sept. 6, 2011); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
CFTC Grants ICE Clear Europe Limited Registration as a Derivatives Clearing
Organization (Jan. 25, 2010); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
CFTC Grants New York Portfolio Clearing, LLC Registration as a Derivatives Clearing
Organization (Feb. 1, 2011); In re London Clearing House, Order of Registration (2001);
In re Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Inc., Order of Transfer of Derivatives Clearing
Organization Registration (2010); In re Natural Gas Exchange, Inc., Order of
Registration (2008); In re North American Derivatives Exchange, Amended Order of
Registration (2010); In re The Options Clearing Corporation, Order of Registration
(2001); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Requests Public
52
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The Dodd-Frank Act reflects Congress and regulators’
perception that centralized clearing will “foster greater
efficiencies . . . and promote transparency” in the OTC
56
derivatives markets. A clearinghouse functions as a central
counterparty, agreeing to act as an intermediary for all
57
transactions that are cleared and settled on its platform. As a
central counterparty, the clearinghouse agrees to act as a buyer
in each transaction in which a clearinghouse member seeks to
58
enter into a contract as a seller. When a clearinghouse
member seeks to enter into a transaction as a seller, the
59
clearinghouse agrees to act as a buyer. By standing in the
middle, the clearinghouse becomes the counterparty for each
60
transaction executed on its platform.
Clearinghouses offer market participants many
benefits. Similar to the benefits of an exchange, the
introduction of a clearinghouse lowers spreads and transaction
61
costs for users and enhances price discovery. Clearinghouses
62
63
facilitate loss mutualization, credit-risk homogenization, and
64
65
multilateral netting, improving market efficiency.
Clearinghouses reduce the risk of counterparty default.
By acting as an intermediary in each agreement that is
Comment on an Application by Eurex Clearing AG for Registration as a Derivatives
Clearing Organization (Sept. 29, 2011).
56
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75
Fed. Reg. 65,885 (proposed Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
57
Id.
58
See Robert R. Bliss & Chryssa Papathanassiou, Derivatives Clearing,
Central Counterparties and Novation: The Economic Implications 19-24 (Mar. 8, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ecb.int/events/pdf/conferences/ccp/
BlissPapathanassiou_final.pdf.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
As described above, the organizational documents of clearinghouses
provide for the clearinghouse to maintain reserves to provide sufficient assets to cover
any clearinghouse member’s default on contractual obligations. In addition, the
clearinghouse also has authority to seek additional capital contributions if the losses
related to a member’s default exceed reserves. See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, The Economics
of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing
of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty 26 (Jan. 8, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the University of Houston Department of Finance), available
at http://www.cba.uh.edu/spirrong/clearing_organization.pdf.
63
Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic
Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (2011).
64
See, e.g., Pirrong, supra note 62, at 26.
65
Id.
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registered, cleared, and settled on its platform, the
clearinghouse mitigates members’ exposure to the risk of
66
another member’s default. Because the clearinghouse is the
central counterparty to each transaction, members no longer
face the risk that counterparties will default on their
67
contractual obligations. In addition to its services as a
matchmaker—pairing trade requests from members—the
clearinghouse also agrees to act as a guarantor for transactions
68
executed on the clearinghouse platform. Consequently, the
clearinghouse must adopt effective risk-management policies
that vigilantly monitor members’ abilities to satisfy obligations
related to transactions executed on its platform.
Traditionally, clearinghouses employ several strategic
risk-management mechanisms to ensure that members satisfy
69
Clearinghouses establish
their contractual obligations.
collateral and margin requirements that provide a means for
70
the clearinghouse to mitigate a member’s default.
Clearinghouses periodically evaluate members’ credit quality
and require members to contribute to a reserve fund or, in the
event of a liquidity crisis, to contribute capital to preserve the
solvency and integrity of the clearinghouse. As a result, the
clearinghouse insulates each member from the risk that
another member will default on obligations cleared and settled
71
on the clearinghouse platform.

66

Id. at 17, 22-25; see, e.g., id. at 3-5 (arguing that the clearinghouse will only
offer these benefits in markets that reflect conditions of complete information, but noting
that market conditions, asymmetries of information, incentives to shift costs and
distributive effects on pricing of default risk may increase systemic risk); see also Robert
R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and Settlement: A Comparison of
Central Counterparties and Alternative Structures, 30 ECON. PERSP. 22, 24-26 (2006).
67
See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 66, at 25 (“Credit risk, on the other
hand, is centralized in the CCP itself”). Generally, clearinghouses only enter into
matching transactions, meaning a clearinghouse will enter into an agreement with a
member (Member A) acting as a protection seller only if the clearinghouse has already
identified another member (Member B) who agrees to enter into a contemporaneous
arrangement whereby the clearinghouse assigns its rights and obligations as a
protection seller in the agreement with Member A to Member B. By matching
transactions and substituting members into its positions in agreements clearing and
settling on its platform, the clearinghouse minimizes its exposure to counterparty
default risk. Id. at 24 (“A [clearinghouse] can be defined as ‘[a]n entity that interposes
itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets,
becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.’” (citation omitted)).
68
See id. at 24-25.
69
See id. at 25.
70
See id.
71
See Squam Lake Working Grp. on Fin. Regulation, Credit Default Swaps,
Clearinghouses, and Exchanges 4 (Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper, 2000),
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On the one hand, clearinghouses will likely have the
effect of reducing systemic risk by interposing a central
counterparty in each derivatives transaction. The introduction
of clearinghouses alleviates concerns that one of the two
counterparties to a derivatives agreement will default on its
72
obligations. On the other hand, clearinghouses concentrate
default risk. If the clearinghouse inaccurately assesses the
creditworthiness of a member and the member defaults on its
73
obligations, the clearinghouse may incur a loss. Significant
errors in setting margin and collateral obligations may
74
ultimately cause the clearinghouse to become insolvent.
Having the clearinghouse act as the backstop for all
agreements cleared on its platform creates concerns that a
systemically significant financial institution may default,
75
causing extensive losses that bankrupt the clearinghouse. The
potential bankruptcy of a clearinghouse creates systemic risk
concerns. After agreements migrate from the private, bilateral
market to clearinghouses, the threat of systemic risk shifts
from a concern that a systemically significant financial
institution (or series of systemically significant financial
institutions) might fail, to the threat that the clearinghouse
may face a liquidity crisis. In the event of a clearinghouse
failure, the government might be compelled to extend funds to
bail-out the clearinghouse to prevent a wave of losses across
the industry. Thus, rigorous risk-management policies serve a
critical role in the clearinghouse’s success and, by extension,
76
the successful mitigation of systemic risk.
II.

THE LIMITATIONS OF REFORM: CLEARINGHOUSES ARE
NOT A PANACEA

While the clearing requirements imposed by the DoddFrank Act offer a safeguard that enhances risk oversight in the
operational framework of the OTC derivatives market, there
are concerns that the legislation offers too little guidance
regarding clearing organizations’ internal risk governance
policies. As a consequence of the mandatory clearing
available at http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/credit-default-swaps-clearinghousesexchanges/p19756.
72
See generally Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 66.
73
See id. at 25.
74
See id.
75
See id.
76
See generally id.
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requirement, all eligible transactions must be executed on the
platform of one of the few authorized clearinghouses. Currently
only a handful of clearing businesses have received
authorization to clear and settle OTC derivatives transactions.
Ironically, the transition from private, bilateral agreements to
an organized, more transparent market may have the effect of
concentrating risk in OTC derivatives markets. Thus, the
limited competition in the clearing industry may concentrate
risk and perpetuate systemic risk concerns.
In addition to concerns about effective risk management in
the operational framework of the OTC derivatives market, there
are fundamental concerns regarding the concentration of decisionmaking authority within the internal governance structure of
authorized clearinghouses. A small number of systemically
significant financial institutions or large dealers exercise voting
control in the few authorized clearinghouses. Large dealers have
voting control and the authority to elect directors who decide the
clearinghouses’ risk-management policies. When the commercial
interests of these large dealers diverge from the clearinghouse’s
commercial interests or the normative legislative goals of the
Dodd-Frank Act, a new set of systemic risk concerns emerges. In
effect, this arrangement places decision-making authority
regarding the internal risk-management policies of OTC
derivatives clearinghouses in the hands of institutions whose
internal risk oversight failures related to OTC derivatives
products triggered a global economic recession.
A.

Clearinghouse Governance

A clearinghouse may be a privately owned business that
is closely held by members who exercise complete voting
control over the governance and affairs of the business.
Alternatively, a clearinghouse may be a company (or the
subsidiary of a company) whose shares are publicly traded on a
77
national securities exchange. In either case, internal policies
77

See CME Grp., 2010 Annual Report 5 (2010) (CME Group is the parent
company of CME Clearing Europe Ltd.); Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT 4 (2010) (ICE is the parent company of ICE Clear Europe Ltd. ICE’s customers
include “corporations, manufacturers, utilities, commodity producers and refiners,
professional traders, financial institutions, institutional and individual investors and
governmental bodies.”); Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. PORTFOLIO CLEARING,
http://www.nypclear.com/faqs (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (“How is the company structured?
NYPC is a 50-50 joint venture between the DTCC and NYSE Euronext.”); LCH.CLEARNET,
http://www.lchclearnet.com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (LCH Clearnet is an independent
company which “is owned 83% by its clients and 17% by [the] exchanges.”); Minneapolis
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78

may limit nonmembers’ access to the clearinghouse’s services.
Generally, nonmember firms may only clear or settle
transactions through a clearinghouse if a member agrees to
serve as an intermediary and executes the transaction on
79
behalf of the nonmember. What motivates such preferential
treatment for members?
Members agree to be subject to periodic credit
evaluations, to make capital contributions, and to maintain
80
collateral and margin accounts to satisfy trading obligations.
Members also agree to contribute to a reserve or guarantee fund
designed to ensure that the clearinghouse remains solvent if a
member defaults on a large contract obligation and its margin
account is insufficient to cover the loss, or if several members
default on multiple contract obligations and their margin
81
accounts contain less collateral than the amount of their losses.
Investing in a clearinghouse affords members the
authority to develop, implement, and enforce the governance
measures of the clearinghouse. This authority permits
members to determine the criteria for membership; it also
allows members to establish collateral and margin policies (and
policies regarding the contributions for reserves or a guarantee
fund), clearing and settlement policies, and risk-management
82
policies. However, clearinghouse members’ interests may be
Grain Exchange, Inc., MGEX BROCHURE (2011), available at www.mgex.com/
documants/MGEXFOLDER_versZE.pdf (MGEX is made up of 399 members in addition to
the board of directors. “Memberships are bought and sold between individuals and firms
with supply and demand affecting prices.”); Frequently Asked Questions, NATURAL GAS
EXCHANGE, INC., http://www.ngx.com/trading_faq.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (“Who
owns NGX?” NGX is wholly owned by TSX Group); see also TMX Grp., First Quarter 2011
Report to Shareholders 60 (2011) (description of the earnings per share)); About Us: IG
Group, NORTH AMERICAN DERIVATIVES EXCHANGE, INC., http://www.nadex.com/
trade/ig-group.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (Nadex is fully backed by IG Group which is
a publicly traded company on the London Stock Exchange.); Options Clearing Corporation,
2010 Annual Report 12 (2010) (OCC’s membership consists of “130 of the largest U.S.
broker-dealers, U.S. future commission merchants, and non-U.S. securities firms. . . . The
stockholder exchanges share equal ownership of OCC.”); Company Profile, EUREX CLEARING
AG, http://www.eurexclearing.com/about/company_profile_en.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2011) (Eurex is a wholly owned subsidiary of Eurex Frankfurt AG and a public company.)
78
See EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND COUNTERPARTY
RISK 52 (2009), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/creditdefaultswapsand
counterpartyrisk2009en.pdf.
79
Id.
80
DARRELL DUFFIE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 424,
POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 21 (2010),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr424.pdf (discussing
resort to capital base).
81
Id.; see also Kress, supra note 63, at 63.
82
Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 66, at 25 (discussing counterparty credit
risk management techniques).
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strikingly diverse and certain members’ interests may diverge
from the collective profit-maximizing, risk management, or
long-term stability-oriented interests of the broader group of
clearinghouse members. Members’ authority to determine
clearinghouse governance policies engenders a distinct set of
risk-management concerns.
Large dealers may exert influence through the election
of clearinghouse board members and the appointment of board
members to particular board committees. Board members and
committees controlled by larger dealers will establish policies
that
affect
the
following:
clearinghouses’
collateral
requirements, capital reserve requirements for margin
accounts, or credit-quality standards used to assess eligibility
for membership and clearing eligibility standards.
Large dealers have incentives to limit smaller dealers’
access to clearinghouse membership. When large dealers act as
brokers for the smaller nonmember dealers, the larger dealers
earn revenues for executing transactions for dealers who are
nonmembers and ineligible for membership. If eligibility
standards preclude smaller dealers from gaining the full benefits
of membership, then small dealers who desire to execute
transactions must seek the assistance of the larger dealers who
are members. Thus, large dealers have commercial incentives to
ensure that smaller dealers remain ineligible for membership.
Prior to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act, large dealers
earned significant profits from the fees that they received for
83
executing transactions on behalf of smaller dealers.
Restricting clearinghouse membership based on the size
of a transaction or the volume of deals that a dealer executes
ensures that smaller dealers must arrange for larger dealers to
84
serve as brokers. This dynamic reflects one conflict of interest
that large dealers face. This conflict portends that rent-seeking
83

See Christine Harper et al., Wall Street Stealth Lobby Defends $35 Billion
Derivatives Haul, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2009), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agFM_w6e2i00; see also Ownership Limitations and
Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based
Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges with Respect to
Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,8845 (proposed
Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
84
See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for SecurityBased Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and
National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under
Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,886 (“Participants may seek to limit the
number of other direct participants in a security-based swap clearing agency in order
to limit competition and increase their ability to maintain higher profit margins.”).
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behavior may undermine the Dodd-Frank Act’s efforts to
enhance transparency and mitigate systemic risk.
Similar to concerns regarding large dealers’ incentives
to place anticompetitive limits on small dealers’ access to
clearinghouse membership, commentators argue that large
dealers with rent-seeking motives may urge boards to adopt
policies that restrict the classes or volume of transactions that
85
may be executed on clearinghouse platforms. Members who
exercise voting control over clearinghouses have incentives to
minimize the products that the clearinghouse deems eligible for
86
clearing. The Dodd-Frank Act exempts contracts that are not
eligible for clearing from mandatory registration and clearing
87
requirements. When clearinghouses adopt restrictive clearing
criteria, fewer products are eligible to be cleared. If
clearinghouse policies permit discriminatory eligibility criteria,
then a large volume of transactions will continue to occur in a
private, bilateral market. As a result, a significant volume of
transactions will remain in the shadows of the market.
Consequently, the effectiveness of mandating clearing through
clearinghouses will be undermined and the opacity in the
secondary market will weaken industry-wide systemic riskmanagement efforts.
Large dealers who control clearinghouse governance have
incentives to adopt very narrow clearing eligibility criteria. By
limiting the types of transactions that are eligible for clearing
through the clearinghouse, large dealers may artificially restrict
the volume of transactions that will be subject to the clearing
88
requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act. Clearinghouses,
85

For a discussion regarding larger dealers’ commercial interests that may
be divergent from the interests of clearinghouse shareholders (owners) or smaller
dealers’ interests in minimizing trading costs, see, for example, DUFFIE ET AL., supra
note 80, at 10 (“[D]ealers have an incentive to maintain the wider bid-ask spreads that
they can obtain in the OTC market . . . . Thus, from the viewpoint of their profits,
dealers may prefer to reduce the migration of derivatives trading from the OTC market
to central exchanges.”).
86
See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for SecurityBased Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and
National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under
Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,887.
87
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 763(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1762 (2010).
88
SEC/CFTC Joint Roundtable, CFTC-SEC Staff Roundtable on Clearing of
Credit Default Swaps 48-49 (Oct. 22, 2010) (statement of Kristin Johnson) [hereinafter
Johnson, Comments] (a roundtable to assist the agencies in the rulemaking process to
implement the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). See
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing
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controlled by private members with diverse commercial
89
objectives, will determine clearing eligibility policies. All the
transactions that a clearinghouse refuses to clear and settle will
be executed in the private market where a large dealer will
likely earn fees for facilitating these transactions.
Large members’ control over clearinghouse board
decision-making processes creates additional risk management
concerns. Many of the large dealers who will exercise control
over clearinghouse voting interests are financial institutions
90
subject to regulatory capital requirements. These members
have significant incentives to encourage the adoption of policies
that reduce the amount of collateral that must be reserved in
their clearinghouse margin accounts or to overvalue the
91
collateral maintained in margin accounts. If the margin and
collateral policies are ineffective, there will be insufficient funds
to cover the losses if a member defaults.
Commentators have argued that the concerns described
92
above threaten to undermine the clearing mandate. Congress
adopted the Dodd-Frank Act to enhance transparency in the
93
OTC derivatives market. The provisions of Title VII of the

Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges
with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,890.
89
Section 763(a) adds new Section 3C(d)(3)(A) to the Exchange Act, which
prohibits the Commission from requiring any clearing agency to accept a securitybased swap for central clearing. See Dodd-Frank Act § 763(a), 124 Stat. at 1764.
90
See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for SecurityBased Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and
National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under
Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,890.
91
See id. at 65,887.
92
This article identifies several critical risk management concerns that arise from
members’ anticompetitive incentives or conflicts of interest. Several ancillary issues generate
similar concerns. For a more detailed treatment of the risk management concerns arising from
clearinghouse governance policies, see Sean Griffith, Incentive Problems in Derivatives
Trading: Towards a New Corporate Governance Structure for Clearinghouses 24 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author) and Rena S. Miller, Cong. Research Serv., R 41715,
Conflicts of Interest in Derivatives Clearing 5-6 (Mar. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the Cornell University ILR School), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1832&context=key_workplace.
93
Representative Barney Frank stated:
The purpose of this in part is to get many more derivatives cleared. But the
clearing houses have the right to refuse them if they say the transactions
aren’t suitable for clearing. We believe that some banks have an interest in
not having them cleared. So we don’t want entities that have an interest and
[sic] there being no clearing, owning the clearing houses. That’s why this is
an important amendment to us, and it was passed after considerable debate
on the House floor.
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Dodd-Frank Act plainly aim to increase the volume of OTC
94
derivatives transactions cleared on clearinghouse platforms.
Influenced by conflicts and self-interested incentives,
clearinghouse members’ decisions may ironically engender—
rather than reduce—risk. Without formal governance
safeguards, clearinghouses will not serve as the gatekeepers in
OTC derivatives markets that Congress and regulators
envision. While the introduction of clearinghouses alleviates
some concerns regarding systemic risk in OTC derivatives
markets, the imposition of clearing requirements without
sufficient internal governance controls offers an incomplete
solution. Procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure that
these conflicts of interest and self-interested incentives do not
undermine the risk-reducing framework that the Dodd-Frank
Act
introduces.
These
safeguards
should
address
anticompetitive incentives that would disadvantage smaller
dealers and reduce the volume of transactions subject to
clearing requirements as well as promote appropriate risk
management policies to ensure that the clearinghouse remains
95
sufficiently liquid and solvent.
B.

Proposed Rules to Address Clearinghouse Governance
and Reduce Systemic Risk

Concerns regarding clearinghouse members’ commercial
incentives and conflicts of interest have incited a rigorous
debate among market participants, regulators, and
96
commentators. Prior to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act,
legislators did consider adopting statutory language that would
have ensured balanced participation in clearinghouse
97
governance. Congressional debate prior to the adoption of the
final language of the Act reflects commentators’ concerns that

Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap
Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities
Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg.
at 65,887 n.39 (quoting House-Senate Conf. Comm. Holds Markup on HR 4173,
Financial Regulatory Overhaul Bill, June 24, 2010, reprinted in CQ Congressional
Transcripts, 111th Cong. 182 (2010) (statement of Barney Frank, Chairman, House
Comm. on Fin. Servs.)).
94
Miller, supra note 92, at 3-4.
95
Johnson, Comments, supra note 88, at 48-49.
96
Griffith, supra note 92, at 21.
97
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-370, at 188-92 (2009).
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clearinghouse members’ self-interest might undermine
98
operational safeguards designed to reduce risk.
For example, Representative Stephen Lynch proposed an
amendment to the working bill in the House of Representatives
suggesting that the bill include language addressing members’
99
incentives to restrict access to membership. The “Lynch
Amendment” proposed limiting the voting interest of large
dealers and imposing governance requirements designed to
ensure that a majority of the members of the clearinghouse
100
boards were independent. While the Lynch Amendment was
101
not incorporated in the legislation, the enacted statute does
include language that empowers federal regulatory agencies to
adopt rules addressing concerns regarding members’ incentives
to restrict clearing eligibility and for clearinghouse
102
membership. Acting pursuant to the express authorization
extended in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, regulators have
proposed governance measures that aim to address large
dealers’ conflicts of interest and their incentives to favor weak
103
risk governance policies.
In October 2010, the SEC and the CFTC proposed rules
104
Employing board
to address risk governance concerns.
composition measures similar to the reforms adopted in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that
enhance the risk-governance policies within publicly traded

98

See id.
See id.
100
Id.
101
Miller, supra note 92, at 6.
102
Id.
103
See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for SecurityBased Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and
National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under
Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,896 (proposed Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
104
Both the CFTC and the SEC proposed rules in October 2010. See
Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets,
and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75
Fed. Reg. 63,732 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010); Governance Requirements for Derivatives
Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities;
Additional Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed.
Reg. 722 (Jan. 6, 2011); Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for
Security-Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities,
and National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under
Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,895. In March 2011, the federal regulatory agencies
released statements indicating that they were reopening the ninety-day comment
period on the proposed rules. As of the date that this article is printed, the regulatory
agencies have not adopted interim or final rules.
99
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105

companies, the proposed rules suggest substantive corporate
106
governance reforms. The proposals suggest two alternative
approaches designed to ensure that clearinghouse boards are
not controlled by a few dominant market participants—voting
107
caps and board composition requirements.
The SEC describes the first approach as the “Voting
108
Interest Focus Alternative.” Consistent with its title, the
Voting Interest Focus Alternative creates individual and
109
aggregate ownership limits for specified entities —a group of
the larger swap dealers and banks engaging in swap
transactions. Under the Voting Interest Focus Alternative, a
specified entity is prohibited from beneficially owning more
110
than 20 percent of the voting interests in the clearinghouse.
In addition to this limit on each individual clearinghouse
member’s voting interests, the proposed rule prevents specified
entities from beneficially owning more than 40 percent of the

105

For a discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Act reforms, see supra
notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
106
See Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations,
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities; Additional
Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. at 722,
723 nn.8-9 (citing section 726(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 8323(a)); Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of
Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,883.
107
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75
Fed. Reg. at 65,894-903; Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations,
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation
of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,737-44.
108
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75
Fed. Reg. at 65,894.
109
Under section 765(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is authorized to
adopt rules that create numerical limits on the voting control of “Specified Entities,”
which include bank holding companies with consolidated assets of $50 billion or more,
a nonbank financial company, an affiliate of a bank holding company or nonbank
financial company, a security-based swap dealer, or a major security-based swap
participant. Id. at 65,883. A parallel provision under section 726(a) of the Dodd-Frank
Act authorizes the CFTC to adopt rules limiting the voting control of Enumerated
Entities. Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations,
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities; Additional
Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. at 723
nn.8-9 (citing section 726(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8323(a)).
110
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75
Fed. Reg. at 65,894.
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111

aggregate voting interests of a clearinghouse. The aggregate
limit “restrict[s] participants’ ability to collectively acquire a
112
majority voting interest.” Under the second approach—the
“Governance Focus Alternative”—no clearinghouse member or
specified entity may own more than 5 percent of the voting
113
The Governance Focus
interests in a clearinghouse.
Alternative’s smaller limit on voting control is not coupled with
114
an aggregate voting limit. The voting limitations aim to
address concerns that large dealers will encourage the adoption
of anticompetitive membership and clearing eligibility policies.
To ensure the effectiveness of clearinghouses’ risk
governance policies, the proposals impose board composition
115
and board committee obligations. Under the Voting Interest
Focus Alternative, the proposal limiting individual voting
interest to 20 percent of the clearinghouse’s voting interests
and imposing an aggregate voting interest limit of 40 percent
on specified entities, the clearinghouse must appoint
independent directors to at least 35 percent of the board
116
seats. Under the Governance Focus Alternative with the
smaller 5 percent voting limitation and no aggregate voting
limit, the proposed rules require the clearinghouse to appoint
117
independent directors to a majority of the seats on the board.
In addition to these board composition requirements, each
proposal requires the board of the clearinghouse to establish a
nominating committee, disciplinary panel, and risk118
management committee. The proposed board structural and
111

Id. at 65,895.
Id.
113
Id. at 65,900.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 65,896, 65,901-02.
116
Id. at 65,896. The CFTC proposal requires “public directors,” but defines
public directors in a manner consistent with the SEC definition of “independent
director.” See Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated
Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts
of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,742 & n.73 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010).
117
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75
Fed. Reg. at 65,901.
118
Under the SEC’s Voting Interest Focus Alternative, clearinghouses must
appoint independent directors to at least a majority of the seats on the nominating
committee. Under the Governance Focus Alternative only independent directors may
be appointed to the nominating committee. Id. at 65,897, 65,901-02. Under the CFTC
approval, the chair for the disciplinary panels must be a public director. Requirements
for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap
Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at
112
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compositional requirements aim to serve as a critical “check
119
against conflicts of interest.”
The spirit of these measures exemplifies the type of
reform that Partnoy endorses in his analysis of the recent
crisis. Partnoy encourages financial market intermediaries to
120
incorporate a “pause” or delay in their deliberative processes.
While regulators’ responses to the need for clearinghouse
governance are laudable, the proposed reforms merely alter the
composition of the board; the proposed reforms will likely be
insufficient to address clearinghouse members’ conflicts of
interest and their incentives to act in manners contrary to
regulatory goals. Several noteworthy problems undermine the
presumption that the proposed board composition reforms will
be sufficient to address the conflicts of interest and incentives
described above. For example, the limited pool of qualified
director candidates creates a persistent problem. In order to
develop, implement and enforce effective risk management
policies, clearinghouse boards will recruit from a small circle of
experts and industry insiders. In this insular group, it is
unlikely that there will be a large pool of truly independent
candidates that lack material and relational ties to large
dealers. While there may be candidates who qualify under the
regulators’ criteria, it is unlikely that candidates with
appropriate qualifications will not have material ties to the
dominant financial institutions acting as large dealers—or
aspirations to develop ties after their prestigious appointments
to clearinghouse boards.
Moreover, clearinghouses are self-regulatory organizations.
Because they function as critical engines in the operation of
financial markets, clearinghouses serve a unique public-private
function. The effects of their services impact the broader
economy. Yet these institutions are either closely held or
publicly traded businesses that face demands from a diverse
group of constituents. When members elect directors to serve
on clearinghouse boards, the members—financial institutions
63,740. The risk management committee requirements in the CFTC proposal offer
greater details regarding the participation of public directors and include a
requirement that at least 10 percent of the participants on the risk management
subcommittee be customer representatives. Id. at 63,741-42.
119
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75
Fed. Reg. at 65,896.
120
See generally Partnoy, supra note 5.
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and financial services intermediaries—generally nominate
their own senior executives as candidates for clearinghouse
board seats. These elected directors are then presumed to vote
consistent with the commercial interests of the member
institution that promoted their candidacy. These directors may
find it difficult to serve their employers’ commercial interests
and support policies consistent with the clearinghouse’s quasiregulatory role. Significant risk governance concerns arise
when members’ proprietary interests diverge from the
regulatory presumption that clearinghouses serve as an
institutional safeguard against systemic risk or moral hazard.
C.

Improving Clearinghouse Boards’ Decision-Making
Processes

Recalling the famous visual awareness experiments by
Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons, Frank Partnoy
explains that one of the most significant issues in developing
effective regulatory reform is identifying the “gorilla” in the
121
Exploring Chabris and Simons’s claim that
room.
inattentional blindness can challenge even the most diligent
observer, Partnoy offers several illustrations from the recent
financial crisis that demonstrate the weaknesses in the
decision-making processes of several highly sophisticated
122
financial institutions.
The special position that clearinghouses occupy in financial
systems justifies regulatory oversight that ensures careful
development of governance policies. These policies must include
provisions that address challenges such as members’ incentives to
adopt anticompetitive membership and clearing eligibility criteria.
For example, expanding the definition of independence offers one
approach to encourage a more impartial dialogue in clearinghouse
boardrooms. In addition, best practice standards and the proposed
rules suggest that clearinghouse boards should create
subcommittees focused on addressing risk-management concerns.
121

See id. at 162.
See generally id; see also CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE
INVISIBLE GORILLA: AND OTHER WAYS OUR INSTITUTIONS DECEIVE US 5-6 (2010).
Chabris and Simons’s experiment illustrates the challenge of perceiving an extremely
odd event—a gorilla entering the room—when executing a specified task. Id. In
conducting their experiment, they tasked subjects with counting the number of times
that team members passed a basketball during a short video. Id. at 5. During the short
video, a person in a full gorilla suit appears on the video screen. Id. at 6. Half of the
subjects participating in the experiment did not see the gorilla. Id.
122
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Combining these potential solutions, independent directors may
offer invaluable contributions through their service on riskmanagement committees. Such committees would have significant
autonomy to review and investigate risk-management concerns.
The risk-management committee or its members must also play a
significant role in the development of policies that may be within
the purview of other committees whose decisions have significant
risk management implications. For example, risk management
committee members must participate in establishing standards for
margin and collateral requirements.
An adaptive and engaging risk-management committee
will improve the board’s ability to anticipate and address riskmanagement issues that threaten the stability of the
clearinghouse and pose systemic risk concerns. The directors
appointed to this committee should not only lack material
financial ties, but they should also have established expertise
in managing clearinghouse or exchange risk; they should be
capable of articulating weaknesses in proposed riskmanagement policies and evaluating such policies objectively.
To ensure the benefits of the recently enacted DoddFrank Act, risk-management committees should include a board
member designated as the contrarian. This board member
should raise alternative strategies and question the prevailing
123
opinion. Continuous critical evaluation of risk-management
124
policies may lead to revelations about latent weaknesses.
CONCLUSION
Creating procedural safeguards that delay decisionmaking processes, or instituting a “pause,” may reduce
concerns that members’ self-interested incentives will dominate
clearinghouses’ risk-management decisions. The currently
proposed voting limitations and board structure and
composition reforms are likely insufficient to address these
concerns. Even if the proposed voting limits and corporategovernance obligations are formally adopted, clearinghouses
may fail to accomplish the statute’s desired public policy effect.
To truly impart reform, legislators and regulators must
123

See Troy A. Parades, Corporate Decisionmaking: Too Much Pay, Too Much
Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 673, 741-47 (2005) (explaining that recent federal reforms are not a
substitute for directly addressing psychological biases that motivate managers).
124
Id.
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address the cognitive biases and risk culture concerns that will
likely permeate clearinghouses’ risk-management policies.
Federal regulatory agencies must explore alternative
remedies that address cognitive biases and their influence on
risk-management decisions. This article suggests imagining
creative solutions that reach beyond the common regulatory
responses to traditional corporate governance. Reforms must
introduce procedural safeguards that ensure that decision
makers “pause” in their deliberative processes. For most
boards, incorporating a sufficiently rigorous procedural
mechanism offers a valuable addition to their decision-making
process and enhances governance. However, in the context of
clearinghouse boards, such procedural mechanisms may be
critical to ensure boards adopt sufficiently rigorous risk
management policies. The suggested internal procedures create
a type of “pause” that enables decision makers to better
manage the risks they face and, consequently, reduce the
threat of systemic risk and prevent future crises.

